Showing posts with label GE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GE. Show all posts

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Select Comfort not getting any better

Select Comfort gave a brief overview of 4th Quarter results and there is very little to like about them. The current advertising isn't working except for specials and sales. When a sale ends, the stores lose significant traffic. Worse, the company will be raising prices in January to cover increased materials prices. The last year and a half has been miserably poor for shareholders.

I'm listening to Winning by Jack Welch and it opened my eyes to where Select Comfort is going wrong. Traditionally, mattresses are a commodity business. According to Mr. Welch, there are only three things a commodity producer can change: a) price, b) quality, and c) service. Like the NASA mantra (cheaper, better, faster), you can only choose two. So, for instance, at Costco, you get price and quality (= value), but no service. At a traditional mattress store, you get more service, but sacrifice either quality or price. Until recently, Select Comfort was able to side-step that game because they had an innovative product that differentiated itself by being a completely separate category—adjustable mattresses.

This past year, other companies began to invade the category. I noticed that advertisers have started using phrases like "select your level of comfort" that are right out of Select Comfort's play book. Costco now sells mattress very similar to the Sleep Number bed. Further, other technologies such as memory foam are becoming mainstream. In other words, the air mattress is now a commodity.

Now there are two choices for the company: shift to a commodity strategy or find some other way to innovate. Now we don't know what direction management will take but I think we have some clues. Last month, Select Comfort hired a new Chief Marketing Office, Catherine Bur-Hall. Before that, Ms. Hall was a Vice President of Marketing at Midas Printing. Printing is even more of a commodity business than mattresses and from what I can tell, the Hong Kong company has focused on quality and service as its strategy. If it's going to be a commodity, those are the areas Select Comfort is likely to have greatest strength.

When I last bought this company, I made a mistake. I thought their product had a sustainable advantage that could be exploited for years to come. I thought they owned enough mind-share to propel the brand forward with a few tweaks to the advertising. I think management made the same mistake. The cost in terms of market value has been substantial and I think the board needs to hold management responsible.

But the market has clearly over-reacted. At $6.63, earnings would need to shrink by 5% or so over the next ten years in order to be justified. Given more reasonable growth rates, the price should be $15 to $18 a share. The market is assuming that not only will Select Comfort become a commodity business, but it will also fail to be competitive. Those are far from certain in my opinion.

Monday, July 25, 2005

GE mentality

Joel Spolsky just wrote an article about how software companies make money. Basically, since there is no incremental cost to shipping more software, only the top supplier of a certain type of software can survive. If you aren't number one, you can't sell enough to make back the costs of hiring a bunch of developers to create your product.

That's why it's so encouraging to me that Oracle's Larry Ellison has embraced the GE mentality: "the belief that businesses must be, or become, number one or number two in their marketplaces." Oracle already has the number one possition in database, but they needed to buy PeopleSoft in order to remain or become number two in certain applications.

Monday, March 07, 2005

Mono-linked chains

Warren Buffett just released his annual letter to shareholders, which explained the results of Berkshire Hathaway in 2004. He commented on a $579 million loss in a zinc mining loss:

Our failure here illustrates the importance of a guideline — ­ stay with simple propositions —­ that we usually apply in investments as well as operations. If only one variable is key to a decision, and the variable has a 90% chance of going your way, the chance for a successful outcome is obviously 90%. But if ten independent variables need to break favorably for a successful result, and each has a 90% probability of success, the likelihood of having a winner is only 35%. In our zinc venture, we solved most of the problems. But one proved intractable, and that was one too many. Since a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it makes sense to look for —­ if you'll excuse an oxymoron —­ mono-linked chains.

This is such a good analogy. I also think it reflects an investment philosophy I didn't know I held until now. My first (and one of my favorite) investments was Oracle. Over the years, it has taken some huge, bet-the-company risks. But in every case (at least from what I remember reading Softwar) the risks have involved one, key variable. For instance, each of the complete software rewrites (which are very risky) pivoted on having a better product at the end of the processes and little else. Time and again Larry Ellison bet Oracle the company on Oracle the database. Buying PeopleSoft, in fact, will have been a successful risk if Oracle manages to move a wide variety of applications onto a single database schema.

Select Comfort is also a one-link chain: the adjustable airbed. Like Oracle, the company has focused on one, big idea — the hedgehog approach. Since Sleep Number beds can fold into a handful of boxes, they are shipped directly to the customer. Since most people aren't familiar with the idea, Select Comfort stores, commercials, QVC shows, and the website are geared toward showing how the beds improve a person's quality of life. Since the beds are made to order, customers have a range of choices about which controls, mattress covers, air pumps, pillow tops, sizes (including the Grand King (80" x 98") designed for 6'11" Kevin Garnett), and foundations. There are any number of things that can go wrong, but as long as it's possible to sell high-quality air mattresses, Select Comfort is probably going to do alright.

Raytheon is moving in the direction of being a single link. It used to sell everything from microwave ovens to Patriot missiles. At some point, this made sense — microwaves used to be high-technology. Lately, Raytheon has been selling off or ending businesses that don't fit into the government contracts umbrella. Increased dependence on one customer might seem foolish except that the customer is schizophrenic. It still has too many links, but at least management has learned its lesson from the diversification adventure.

I have a harder time justifying Canon on the "one-link" criteria. I'm tempted to say optics excellence, but one of Canon's biggest revenue streams is printer ink. Fujio Mitarai, Canon's CEO, says, " Canon was built on the foundation of original innovative technology." But I think Canon's success is due to a uniquely Japanese ability to mold thousands of employees to a single philosophy. Many of Canon's investor relations documents describe the idea of "kyosei", which is translated "living and working together for the common good". If so, the risk is that this bubbly optimism might fail to produce new and better products at a reasonable expense.

Maybe it's naive to think that Canon has really implanted kyosei into its culture. But look at this quote in a press release of the death of Sony's founder:

"Mr. Ibuka has been at the heart of Sony's philosophy. He has sowed the seeds of deep conviction that our products must bring joy and fun to users. Mr. Ibuka always asked himself what was at the core of 'making things,' and thought in broad terms of how these products could enhance people's lives and cultures.
Or this quote from the Toyota Forklift division:
At Toyota facilities around the globe, "kaizen" is a word mentioned frequently. The word means "continuous improvement" and is a key factor in Toyota quality. Kaizen has been incorporated into the Toyota Production System driving our engineering and manufacturing teams to constantly improve our lift trucks. It also drives our service personnel.

Coming full circle, Berkshire Hathaway is a horrendously complicated company rivaled only by GE. Any attempt to evaluate the company would require intimate and detailed knowledge of a company that sells everything from candy to catastrophic re-insurance. Ultimately, Berkshire investors are risking their investment on the philosophy described in the Berkshire "Owner's Manual".

Tuesday, October 26, 2004

A coin flip

Imagine that someone offered you a chance to win a million dollars if you can correctly guess the result of a coin flip. The expected payout would be $500,000 and you could probably sell the chance to some wealthy individual for almost that amount. Buying the chance for $450,000, for instance would be a $50,000 expected return. In other words for a small price (relatively speaking, of course), you could trade a situation with an extreme range of outcomes for a certain outcome.

This is an example of a win-win hedge: you get a large sum of money and the other party gets a discounted chance at a large payout. If the buyer can make this sort of transaction over and over, he'll make a good profit with moderate risk. This is how casinos and insurance companies work more or less.

Suppose you decided to keep the chance and sell a chance to win a million dollars on that same coin flip to someone else. You have an expected return of $500,000 on the first transaction and ($500,000) on the second (plus whatever you sold the chance for). But there are two possible way for these transactions to pay out. It all depends on whether or not you make the same guess as the person you sold a chance to. Here's a chart showing the difference:

You  | Same | Not 
-----|------|--------------
Win  |   0  |  $1,000,000
Loss |   0  | ($1,000,000)

In other words, if the guesses are the same, it's no different than selling your chance. But if they are different, the variation of results is huge. You would risk nothing in the first case and everything on the second. Statistically speaking, you would say that the results if the guesses are the different have a correlation of 1 and -1 when they are the same. If the bets were on two coin flips, the correlation in either case would be 0.

Obviously this is an extreme simplification of what investors are faced with. I own Raytheon stock and work for Raytheon, but there's not a huge amount of correlation between my job security and my company's performance. In some ways the election will matter a lot more, since I depend more on the federal budget than on Raytheon itself.

Real life is more like betting on hundreds of coin flips and we don't always know how they are going to interact. Like an insurance company, you have to spread out the risk and buy it at a discount.